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I. INTRODUCTION

The Constitution contains two due process clauses. One is in the
fifth amendment and applies to actions of the federal government.,
The other is in the fourteenth amendment and applies to actions of
state and local governments.2 Together these clauses stand for the
proposition that no governmental entity shall "deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

*Professor of Law, University of San Diego. B.A., 1965, Williams College; LL.B., 1968,
Yale University. I acknowledge gratefully the constructive suggestions from my colleagues Paul
Horton, Maimon Schwarzschild, and Chris Wonnell.
1. The fifth amendment states: "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833), the Supreme Court held that the fifth amendment applied only
to actions of the federal government, not to actions of state governments.
2. The fourteenth amendment states: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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It is universally agreed that these clauses, which I shall refer to
in the singular as the due process clause, govern the procedures by
which rules and policies are applied in particular cases. This function
of the due process clause is commonly referred to as "procedural due

process." By contrast, it is a matter of great controversy whether,
and to what extent, the due process clause governs the substantive
content of rules and policies, 3 although some forms of "substantive
due process" appear solidly entrenched. For example, the incorporation of the substantive values of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, 4 and the "reverse incorporation" of
equal protection principles into the fifth amendment's due process
clause,- no longer raise eyebrows.
My topic in this paper is procedural due process. I shall argue that
the meaning of procedural due process is determined by the various
substantive constitutional values at stake when rules and policies are
applied in particular cases. The terms "life, liberty, and property" are
best thought of as referring to all interests the deprivation of which
can implicate substantive constitutional values.6 The process "due"
whenever the deprivation of those interests is at issue is the process
that those substantive constitutional values entail. 7 I reject theories

3. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 249-82 (1977); M. PERRY, THE
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1-2 (1982); Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process
by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 159.
4. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 567-68 (1978).
5. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
6. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 19 (1980); Alexander & Horton, Ingraham v.
Wright: A Primerfor Cruel and Unusual Jurisprudence, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1305, 1311-12,
1371-72 (1979) [hereinafter Primer];Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 405, 421 (1977); Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 980 n.12 (1986) [hereinafter State Law Wrongs].
7. In its procedural mode at least, the due process clause is not absolutely necessary for
accomplishing its constitutional purpose. That purpose could have been achieved directly by the
substantive constitutional values themselves. But the Constitution is full of provisions that are,
strictly speaking, redundant.
My own favorite theory for the purpose behind the due process clause goes as follows. The
framers intended there to be limitations on the content of laws. The first amendment, for
example, specifically addresses lawmaldng. In order to make sure that governmental extra-legal
action would not circumvent the constitutional and natural rights limitations on the content of
laws, the framers added the due process clause, which requires that government take no action
that threatens constitutional values except as prescribed by law. Thus, the laws must be constitutional, and, through the due process clause, the government must confine its activity to activity
under law. See F. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 3-18 (1986); Corwin, The
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of procedural due process that view it as an independent constitutional
right serving values distinct and divorced from the constitutional values governing the substance of rules and policies. I take no stand
here on whether at least some of those substantive constitutional values also have their textual source in the due process clause (substantive
due process), either by incorporation or directly.
I seek to persuade you to accept the substantive nature of procedural due process. The claim is not a novel one. A colleague and I
have made it before,8 and so have others. 9 The affirmative case for
the claim is that substantive constitutional values are prized because
they restrain government's treatment of particular individuals. Their
effect on rules is of only derivative importance. In other words, when
we apply a substantive test of constitutional validity to a rule, at stake
for us are the application" of that rule to individuals and the effect of
such application on substantive constitutional values. Therefore, a
realistic concern with substance entails a concern with the procedures
by which rules are applied. A rule and the procedures for its application
must be treated as a single package for purposes of applying substantive constitutional values.
The negative case for my claim that procedural due process is
derived from substantive constitutional values rests on the proposition
that procedure as a free-standing value divorced from all substantive
constitutional concerns has little to recommend it. Procedure entails
costs, monetary and non-monetary. Procedure can be made more or
less elaborate and accurate as a method of fact-finding depending upon
the costs we wish to pay. But unless we can attach constitutional
significance to the benefits that increasingly costly procedures obtain,
we have no gauge for determining when we have the procedures that
are constitutionally required. A free-standing constitutional right to
procedure would be a loose cannon on the jurisprudential deck.
Moreover, because the procedure for applying a rule can always be
viewed as part of the substance of the rule itself, a concern for procedure apart from a concern for substance verges on incoherence. Although some theorists argue for an independent right of procedure

Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REv. 366 (1911); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Mayo v. Wilson,
1 N.H. 53, 57 (1817).
8. See Primer, supra note 6, at 1349-88.
9. See Grey, ProceduralFairnessand Substantive Rights, in DUE PROCESS, Nomios XVIII
182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

3

Florida Law
Review,LAW
Vol. REVIEW
39, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 6
OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY

[VCol.39

and attempt to identify some values intrinsic to procedure,1° I find
the significant benefits of procedure to be those associated with substantive constitutional values.
II.

A HYPOTHETICAL CASE FOR TESTING THEORIES OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

Any number of hypothetical cases can illustrate what is at stake
in choosing a theory of procedural due process. I shall use facts very
similar to those of Board of Regents v. Roth," modified when necessary
to illustrate a point. Suppose a state university employs some of its
faculty on one-year appointments, renewable or convertible to a more
permanent appointment if both parties agree. The university's general
standard for deciding whether to renew such appointments is whether
the teacher's classroom teaching, scholarship, and community service
are of high quality and superior to that available to the university
from its pool of applicants.
I shall describe in the next section the alternative procedures the
university might follow in deciding whether to renew a teacher's contract. For now we need to hypothesize three additional things. First,
the state is not constitutionally compelled to create or continue a
teaching position in a state university. The state could abolish state
universities, or reduce their size, and thus eliminate teaching positions,
without violating the Constitution. In other words, teaching positions
in state universities are constitutionally optional benefits. Second, the
hypothesized standard the university employs in making renewal decisions is, viewed apart from the procedures by which it is implemented, constitutionally innocuous. Third, and most important for
my purposes, other standards that the university might have employed
would be substantively unconstitutional, even though the teaching
positions are constitutionally optional. For example, a policy of only
renewing the contracts of Democrats, Catholics, males, or whites
would be unconstitutional. So too would a policy having the effect of
favoring Democrats, Catholics, males, or whites with no offsetting
benefits. Moreover, and of particular importance, an arbitrary policy
such as renewing the contracts of teachers with an odd number of
letters in their last names, or with brown eyes, or those selected by
a Ouija board or by resumes with two inch margins, would be substantively unconstitutional. However, there might be disagreement over

10. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
11. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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whether the substantive constitutional defect in such cases of arbitrary
2
policies was one of substantive due process or equal protection.
With this hypothetical case and these assumptions in place, I shall
argue that procedure is part and parcel of substantive constitutional
guarantees, and that the constitutional mandate of procedure is as
extensive in scope as those substantive guarantees.
III.

THE AFFIRMATIVE CASE: PROCEDURAL CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES ARE ENTAILED BY AND DERIVED FROM
SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES

Typically, a challenge to government action on constitutional
grounds can be characterized either as a challenge to the constitutionality of the rule under which government took its action, or as a
challenge to the application of that rule. The former type of challenge
-

a challenge to the constitutionality of the rule - we normally view

as a substantive constitutional challenge. The latter type of challenge
a challenge to the method employed for finding the facts presupposed by applying the rule to the challenger - we normally view as
a procedural constitutional challenge. It is clear, however, that with
the exception of1 those special instances in which rules are challenged
"on their face,'

3

constitutional challenges involve a claim that a par-

ticular rule's application to a person is unconstitutional, either because
the rule itself is constitutionally defective, or because the process by
which it is applied is constitutionally defective. And in order constitutionally to justify applying a rule to a person, one must justify both
the rule and the rule's application. The latter justification consists of
justifying the procedures by which the facts were found. Failure to
make either of these justifications is the failure to justify, in a constitutional sense, the action government has taken.

12. See Primer, supra note 6, at 1371-82; State Law Wrongs, supra note 6, at 997 n.111.
Even though the courts are often extremely deferential to other branches' decisions that are
challenged as being unconstitutionally arbitrary, the courts do not say that the Constitution
permits those branches to act arbitrarily. There is a constitutional duty not to act arbitrarily,
even ffthe courts indulge a heavy presumption in favor of the non-arbitrariness of government's
acts. Moreover, occasionally that presumption is overcome. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973);
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See generally Michelman, Formal
and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in DUE PROCESS, NOMOs XVIII 126,
13842 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Primer, supra note 6, at 1381-82 n.277; Smoila,
The Reemergence of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw: The Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69, 105-20 (1982).
13. See Alexander, Is There an OverbreadthDoctrine?,22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 541 (1985).
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What should be obvious, but apparently is not, is that failure to
justify the procedure for applying the rule is as much a substantive
constitutional defect as failure to justify the rule itself. Whenever we
debate the substantive constitutionality of general rules and policies
in the abstract, we normally assume those rules will be applied accurately. For example, whenever we debate the constitutionality of a
rule that forbids leafletting on the sidewalks or a rule that mandates
public aid to all private schools, we usually assume that the procedures
by which those rules are applied will select leafletters (and not drunkards) as the targets of sanctions, and all private schools (and not
private hospitals) as the targets of aid. In those debates we are concerned about the actual effects those rules will have; and the effects
are a product of the procedures by which the rules are applied just
as they are a product of the terms of the rules. They may not be as
much a product of the procedures as of the terms because most rules
directed at the citizenry are substantially self-applied. But the procedures by which rules are officially applied will have a varied impact
on the overall effects of those rules. And it is the overall effects effects that are partially the product of procedures for applying the
rules - that either justify or un-justify the rules in a substantive
14
constitutional sense.

Thus, I propose this: (1) the general rule or policy being applied
and the procedure by which it is applied should be viewed as constituting a single package; (2) this rule/procedure package is assessed for
substantive constitutionality whenever we assess the constitutionality

14. I am not denying that the motives behind government actions are constitutionally relevant. The Supreme Court has treated governmental motives as germane to many constitutional
violations. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (freedom of speech); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (equal protection); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishment of religion). Many commentators have endorsed the focus on motives. See J. ELY,
supra note 6, at 138-45 (equal protection, freedom of speech); F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:
A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 80-86 (1982) (freedom of speech). What I am arguing is that
effects are always relevant to constitutionality, even where motive is also relevant. See Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A MetatheoreticalTaxonomy and Critique, 42 OHIO
ST. L.J. 3, 62 (1981) [hereinafter Taxonomy]; Alexander & Horton, The Impossibility of a Free
Speech Principle, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1319, 133646 (1984). When the effects of a rule are
relevant to its constitutionality, the procedure for its application is of constitutional moment.
Moreover, procedure is constitutionally relevant to a motive inquiry as well as to an effects
inquiry in the sense that certain "procedures" can easily disguise the exercise of forbidden

motives and thus may be constitutionally condemned for prophylactic reasons. See also Michelman, supra note 12, at 138-39, 161-62 n.46 (noting the relation between procedures and proof
of forbidden motives).
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of the government's acts; and (3) when the application of a rule is
deemed unconstitutional because the procedure is not adequate, the
application is substantively unconstitutional because of a procedural
defect.
The hypothetical case illustrates this point. We have hypothesized
that the university's policy of renewing the contracts of the most
qualified teachers is, in the abstract, a constitutionally permissible
policy. In so hypothesizing, we are probably envisioning a procedure
for its application that looks something like this: a faculty committee
reads the teacher's scholarship or reads experts' reviews of that
scholarship, attends the teacher's classes or reads student evaluations
of those classes, notes the service activities listed on the teacher's
resume, and compares the teacher's resume with resumes of outsiders
seeking the position. The committee then reports to some other body,
probably the faculty, which ultimately decides whether the teacher's
contract will be renewed.
The renewal policy or rule, applied through this or a similar procedure, is a substantively constitutionally permissible rule/procedure
package, or so it seems to me. In Roth, a similar rule/procedure package
was at issue. The Supreme Court correctly held that Roth's nonrenewal was constitutionally proper, at least in the absence of proof
that the university in fact followed a different policy, such as one of
not renewing teachers who criticize the university. I have no quarrel
with the decision in Roth, although I have a tremendous quarrel with
the approach the Court adopted to justify that decision.
Now suppose the permissible rule to "rehire the most qualified
teachers" is applied using a different procedure from that described
above. Suppose the teacher's scholarship and resume are submitted
to the local chapter of the John Birch Society, the Baptist Church, or
the Ku Klux Klan for their evaluation of the teacher's qualifications,
an evaluation upon which the university would then act. Alternatively,
suppose the university decides who is most qualified, and thus hired
or rehired, by asking a Ouija board or by measuring the margins of
the resumes to see which comes closest to two inches. Given our
earlier hypothesis regarding which rules would be substantively unconstitutional, it seems to follow that the rule "hire or rehire the most
qualified," when applied through the procedures described, produces
a substantively unconstitutional rule/procedure package.
I should emphasize that this point holds true even if the legislature
has committed the hiring of faculty to the complete discretion of the
university. Any exercise of that discretion can be broken into the two
components of adopting a hiring policy and applying the policy adopted.
The hiring policy must comport with substantive constitutional values,
including non-arbitrariness. But those substantive constitutional values
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are safe-guarded only if the application-of-policy component of discre-

tion is not procedurally bizarre.
A number of Supreme Court cases illustrate the interdependency
of substantive and procedural constitutional rights. Most justices on
the Court treated the "irrebuttable presumption" cases of the 1970s

as instances of procedural irregularity, 15 but others, on and off the
Court, (correctly) viewed those cases as raising substantive constitutional issues instead. 16 (Several cases in this group dealt with the
allocation of optional benefits,17 and one case dealt with an allocation
of optional benefits that implicated no substantive constitutional value

other than the value of non-arbitrariness. s) Finally, one recent case
involving the arbitrary treatment of an optional benefit, though not

an irrebuttable presumption case, divided the Court over whether the
unconstitutional arbitrariness was a (procedural) due process violation
or a (substantive) equal protection violation. 9
To recap the argument to this point, substantive constitutional
values are at stake in the award of benefits that government is under

no constitutional obligation to provide. Further, to the extent that
substantive constitutional values are at stake in the award of benefits,
there is a substantive constitutional concern with the procedures by
which adjudicative facts are found. Whether procedure is due depends
upon whether substantive constitutional values are at stake.20
Two final points provide a necessary predicate to a discussion of
alternative views of procedural due process. First, what procedure is
due depends on the substantive constitutional values at stake and how

15. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
16. See generally Alexander, Cutting the GordianKnot: State Action and Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 893, 917 n.66 (1975).
17. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agric.
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
18. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
19. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). Rodney Smolla reaches a conclusion similar to mine. Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of ProtestingToo Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69, 110-11 (1982) (concluding
that Zimmerman requires some procedure in all cases).
20. Occasionally, when the federal government is concerned, an administrator's failure to
follow certain procedures in implementing a legislative rule may not violate any constitutional
right of individuals but may violate instead the constitutional principles of separation of powers.
Thus, even though the procedure would have been constitutionally permissible had it been
legislated along with the substantive rule, it may be impermissible solely because it was not
legislated.
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they might be jeopardized by various procedures.1 (The government's
reasons for providing less procedure than the challenger desires are,
of course, part of the calculus for working out the implications and
limits of various substantive constitutional rights; and because perfect
procedures are impossible, no substantive value can ever be perfectly
realized.) Second, when procedure is due is a function of those same
constitutional values.2 Sometimes the substantive constitutional values
at stake permit government to take action detrimental to individuals
on the basis of a very preliminary assessment of adjudicative facts,
to be followed at some later time by more extensive procedures. At
other times, however, the substantive constitutional values at stake
demand very formal adjudicative procedures before individuals may
be adversely affected. For example, the prior restraint doctrine in
first amendment law can usefully be viewed as requiring in most cases
trials and perhaps appeals before individuals may be prevented from
speaking by the combined threat of punishment and the absence of
the usual defense that the speech is constitutionally protected.
IV.

THE NEGATIVE CASE: PROCEDURAL CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES ARE NEITHER LESS EXTENSIVE THAN NOR
INDEPENDENT OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES

All that I've said to this point may seem obvious to many of you.
Indeed, I hope that it is obvious. It is a virtue of my theory and a
strong sign of its correctness that it is in no way revolutionary but
is instead so commonsensical as to be almost trivial. Those of you who
feel that way - and I hope there are many - may be asking, "Where's
the beef? What's the issue?"
A quick perusal of the Supreme Court's procedural due process
decisions of the past fifteen years and the academic commentary
spawned by those decisions discloses that, no matter how straightforward and commonsensical my analysis has been, considerable confusion
exists over the scope and meaning of the constitutional right to procedure. I am not referring to controversy over what procedures, including their timing, are constitutionally required to protect various interests. The question of what procedures are constitutionally required
in a particular context can be quite difficult and controversial, and

21. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (freedom of speech and
appellate review of fact finding); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (burden of proof for
civil commitment); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (burden of proof for criminal conviction).
22. See Alexander, supra note 16, at 922-30; Primer, supra note 6, at 1358.
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my analysis leaves that type of difficulty basically intact. My analysis
settles a different current controversy: whether any procedural protections are constitutionally mandated in particular cases where government takes action directed at specific individuals. My analysis makes
this an easy question to answer. If substantive constitutional rights
are at stake, then some procedures are always constitutionally required. Why then have so many courts and commentators found this
controversy so difficult to resolve?
I suppose the current confusion over the constitutional protection
of procedure comes from two sources. One source is the old right/
privilege distinction and "the greater power includes the lesser" form
of analysis that seems so plausible in the realm of "privileges." The
other source of confusion is the erroneous equation of a constitutional
right to procedure with a constitutional right to a trial-type hearing.
These two sources of confusion have produced two commonly held but
erroneous conclusions about procedural guarantees: (1) those guarantees are less extensive than substantive constitutional guarantees; and
(2) those guarantees are independent of substantive constitutional
guarantees.
A.

The Right/Privilege Distinction and "The Greater Power
Includes the Lesser" Analysis

There are certain benefits that the Constitution forbids governments to eliminate without adequate justification. There are other
benefits that the Constitution permits governments to eliminate at its
option. The former category of benefits includes freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, privacy, and, to some extent, private property.
The latter category includes, for example, welfare and public employment. The ultimate normative principles that would justify a scheme
under which some benefits are viewed as constitutionally non-optional
and others are viewed as constitutionally optional are quite difficult
to determine. I will not attempt to justify the constitutionally non-optional/optional scheme other than to note that it is a tenet of doctrinal
orthodoxyY3 It goes by the term more familiar to lawyers: the "right/
privilege" distinction.
The non-optional/optional or right/privilege distinction has historically played havoc with constitutional doctrine. It continues to do so
today, primarily because to some, a greater power totally to eliminate
privileges necessarily entails a lesser one to condition the privileges

23.

See Taxonomy, supra note 14, at 16-39.
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as the government sees fit.2 To others, "the greater power includes
the lesser" approach would thoroughly gut the equal protection clause
and the equal protection mode of freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and other substantive constitutional rights.2- These opponents
of "the greater power includes the lesser" approach contend that government may not give welfare only to Republicans or Baptists, even
if it might otherwise choose to give welfare to no one at all. The
proponents of that approach, on the other hand, demand to know "why
not?"
For my purposes, suffice it to note that the current doctrinal orthodoxy indicates that optional benefits may not be conditioned any
way the government would like, but that the reasons why they may
not be so conditioned are murky. Sometimes it is clear that making
an individual relatively worse off with respect to an optional benefit
actually makes the individual absolutely worse off with respect to a
non-optional benefit.2 6 Allowing only Democrats to put up billboards
may penalize Republicans more than if no one were permitted to
construct billboards. But beyond such cases, it is still not clear why
the greater power does not include the lesser, though it is clear that
in many instances it does not.2
Almost all of the modern conceptual difficulties with procedural
due process arise when the benefit at stake is constitutionally optional
that is, where the government could legislatively abolish the benefit
at its pleasure.28 The difficulties that the right/privilege muddle has
spawned for other areas of constitutional law surface in procedural
due process when one asks the obvious question: "How can there be
a constitutional right to a procedure for determining whether one gets
a benefit when there is no constitutional right to the benefit itself?"
Some, employing "the greater power includes the lesser" mode of
analysis, conclude from the right/privilege distinction that if a benefit
is a privilege, it cannot be the object of a constitutional right to
procedure. 29 As the argument goes, if the government may constitu-

24. See MeAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
25. See generally Kreimer, Allocatioal Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984).
26. See Taxonomy, supra note 14, at 35-39.
27. See Kreimer, supra note 25, at 1304-14.
28. See Primer, supra note 6, at 1378-84.
29. See Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85; Grey, supra
note 9; Simon, Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court: A Defense of Roth and Perry, 71
CALir. L. REV. 146 (1983); SmolIa, supra note 19, at 90-94.
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tionally at its whim eliminate the benefit entirely, it makes no sense
to attach a constitutional duty to provide procedures when particular
individuals are denied the benefit.
Here is my reply to this analysis. First, my position is totally
consistent with the orthodox division of benefits into constitutional
rights and mere privileges, or as I call them, constitutionally non-optional and optional benefits. Second, "the greater power includes the
lesser" mode of analysis has been rejected where substantive constitutional rights are concerned. The equal protection clause and the equal
protection mode of the constitutional rights regarding speech, religion,
lifestyle, and so forth, are substantive constitutional constraints on
the award of "privileges." Although it is difficult to work out the
normative theory that justifies both the status of a benefit as optional
and places constraints on its allocation once it is awarded, 30 it is beyond
cavil that within the current framework of constitutional doctrine,
substantive constitutional constraints on the allocation of optional benefits are deeply entrenched.
If one accepts that there are substantive constitutional constraints
in the background of every award or denial of optional benefits, can
one nevertheless hold that there are no procedural constitutional constraints operating? The answer is yes only if the substance of a government rule and the procedure implementing it are not a package.
But I tried to demonstrate earlier that substance and procedure are
a package for purposes of substantive constitutional values. If I succeeded, then it must be true that procedural constitutional constraints
are entailed by substantive constitutional constraints.
The right/privilege distinction has negative implications for a constitutional right to procedure only where it has negative implications
for substantive constitutional constraints. That is, only where government has plenary discretion in a substantive sense in determining how
an optional benefit shall be allocated will government be completely
free to choose its procedures for determining the facts upon which
application of its allocation policy depends. Because it is well-established that government never has such substantive plenary discretion
as a matter of constitutional doctrine, government never is completely
free constitutionally to choose its fact-finding procedures.
Put differently, because I tie the constitutional protection of procedure to the constitutional protection of substantive values, I concede
that had constitutional doctrine developed differently, so that Justice

30.

See Taxonomy, supra note 14, at 35-39; Kreimer, supra note 25, at 1326-51.
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Holmes' "greater power includes the lesser" view of privileges prevailed, 31 there would be no constitutional protection of procedure with
respect to privileges. Since Holmes' view has been thoroughly rejected,
however, constitutional constraints on the fact-finding procedures used
in allocating privileges must be recognized.
I want to make one final point about the role of the right/privilege
distinction in arguments about procedural due process. Chief Justice
Rehnquists and Judge Frank Easterbrook-3 take the following, modified Holmesian position. First, if a benefit is a privilege, by definition
it follows that potential recipients have no constitutional right to the
benefit. Second, if a "sweet" benefit is allocated by means of a "bitter"
procedure, government has bestowed a "bittersweet" package of benefit and procedure. Characterizing the benefit as separable from and
unqualified by the procedures chosen for its allocation would elevate
form over substance. Third, if benefits may be "arbitrarily" eliminated
or reduced by government, which is what is meant by calling them
privileges, then their allocation by means of arbitrary procedures is
constitutionally permissible. There is no constitutional protection
against arbitrary allocation of privileges.
Rehnquist and Easterbrook conclude from this three step analysis
that courts have no business second-guessing the procedures government provides for the allocation of privileges. Both the Supreme Court
and I reject this conclusion. The Court's disagreement occurs at the
second step of the analysis.Y I think the Court is wrong on this point
and Rehnquist and Easterbrook are correct.
My disagreement with Rehnquist and Easterbrook occurs at the
third step. There are specific substantive constitutional values such
as those regarding speech and religion that place limits on the kinds
of benefit-procedure packages the government bestows in the realm
of privileges. But there is also a general substantive constitutional
value that proscribes arbitrariness in the substance of rules and there-

31. When serving on the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Justice Holmes upheld the
dismissal of a policeman for engaging in political activities, writing: '"The petitioner may have
a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517, 220 (1892).
32. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
33. Easterbrook, supra note 29.
34. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1492-93 (1985).
35. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text; Grey, supra note 9, at 202; Mashaw,
Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 433 (1987).
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fore in the procedures by which they are allocated. As I have indicated,
a complete constitutional theory would explain how a benefit can be
a privilege, subject to complete elimination "arbitrarily," and yet still
be limited to non-arbitrary distributions.3s I do not have such a theory
of constitutional arbitrariness. But I believe that such a theory does
underlie the constitutional scheme, 37 that non-arbitrariness is a substantive constitutional value, and that, like all substantive constitutional values, the value of non-arbitrariness places limits on the government's choice of the procedures for allocating privileges 5
B.

The Futile Search for an Independent
ConstitutionalRight to Procedure

Many courts, including most prominently the Supreme Court, and
several commentators take the position that procedural due process
is the Constitution's independent guarantee of certain procedures for
applying rules and policies, and it rests not on the Constitution's
substantive values, but on its own bottom. I obviously reject this
position. An "independent" procedural due process does not fit well
analytically within the overall constitutional structure. Moreover, I
believe that the language of the due process clause, while it evinces
a concern with process, does so in conjunction with a concern for
substantive values that it also evinces. Indeed, I believe that "life,
liberty, and property" are words, not of limitation, but of inclusion,
and that they comprehend all benefits affected by substantive constitutional values 9

36. See Taxonomy, supra note 14, at 35-39.
37. See Mashaw, supra note 35, at 435-38; Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution,
84 COLUM. L. REV.1689 (1984); Perry, Constitutional"Fairness":Notes on Equal Protection
and Due Process, 63 VA. L. REV. 383 (1977).
38. Professor Mashaw's contribution to this symposium may be viewed as a particular
fleshing out of the meaning of "unconstitutionally arbitrary." That is, the pursuit of ends or the
use of means that offend privacy, participation, or intelligibility are inconsistent with the meaning
of citizenship in a liberal democracy. Mashaw, supra note 35, at 440, 442.
Professors Peter Simon and Thomas Grey both come close to endorsing this strong right/
privilege position with respect to at least some privileges. Grey, supra note 9; Simon, s-upra
note 29. They both agree with me that procedures are constitutionally mandated for the sake
of substantive constitutional values. Simon, however, appears to believe that some substantive
decisions can be arbitrary without violating the Constitution. On this point, Grey sides with
me, but underestimates, I believe, the implications a non-substantive-arbitrariness position has
for requiring procedure.
39. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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I believe the motivation to posit a substance-independent procedural due process stems from two sources in addition to any motivation that the Constitution's language provides. First, if one erroneously believes that substantive constitutional rights carry no implications for the procedures through which rules and policies are applied
in specific cases, and if one believes correctly that the Constitution is
concerned with those kinds of procedures, then one is motivated to
posit an independent constitutional right to procedure and locate that
right quite naturally in the due process clause. Second, if one equates
a constitutional right to procedure with a constitutional right to a trialtype hearing - and if one notes correctly that substantive constitutional rights, while they do entail certain procedures for applying rules
and policies, often do not entail trial-type hearings - then one will
conclude that the constitutional right to procedure must be independent of substantive constitutional rights.
I hope my analysis to this point exposes the error of the belief
that substantive constitutional rights carry no procedural implications.
I want to focus here on the second source of the motivation to posit
a substance-independent constitutional right to procedure, the belief
that procedural due process means trial-type hearings.
First, although the Constitution may demand fair and reasonably
accurate procedures whenever applying general rules or policies to
specific individuals carries implications for substantive constitutional
values, the Constitution does not demand trial-type hearings in all
such cases. The grading of a bar applicant's answers on the state's
bar examination could violate several substantive constitutional rights,
depending on what kind of grading procedure is used. But it is ridiculous to suggest that the Constitution demands a trial-type hearing on
the scoring of the answers, or even notice to the bar applicant and
an opportunity to be heard. 4 Countless governmental decisions, from
deciding that someone is guilty of a crime to awarding Sarah a B on
a math quiz, apply rules and policies to specific persons and thus rest
on findings of "adjudicative facts" about specific persons, items, or
41
events that are the traditional concern of procedural due process.
All these decisions can be made in ways that violate substantive rights.

40. See Regents of the Univ. of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985); Board of Curators
v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975); K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAwV TREATISE (2d ed., 1979), § 12.12.
41. See Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); K. Davis, supra note
40, §§ 12.1-.4; Primer,supra note 6, at 1353-62.
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But while some surely merit hearings, or even elaborate trials in the
case of adjudicating criminal guilt, others surely do not.
Second, the equation of procedural due process with trial-type hearings, while it has some precedential support, is not inexorably required
by a fair reading of the cases. There are hoary precedents that deem
notice and the opportunity to be heard to be the minima of due process. 42 But equally hoary precedents consider non-hearing adjudicative-

fact-finding procedures, such as mere inspection of the item that is
the subject of the dispute, as satisfying the requirements of due process. Determinations of whether a vessel is seaworthy, whether the
answers on an examination are correct, or whether a student's clinical
work is acceptable are adjudicative in nature, but the case law indicates
that such determinations need not be made through a trial-type hearing
to satisfy procedural due process. 43 It takes little, if any, reworking
of the precedents to conclude that procedural due process is not
synonymous with trial-type hearings or, what amounts to the same
thing, that "notice" and an "opportunity to be heard" are elastic concepts that can include reading one's resume, viewing one's teaching,
or inspecting one's ship.44
The mistaken equation of due process with trial-type hearings,
especially when conjoined with "the greater power includes the lesser"
view of the right/privilege distinction, has led Supreme Court justices
and academic commentators alike on a futile search for a substance-independent constitutional right to procedure. The "independent"
theories of procedural due process come in the following forms. First,
there are "independent" theories that are essentially competitors with
my substantive theory of procedural due process. These theories face
a twofold burden: they must show that my linking of substance and
procedure is mistaken, and they must show that their own version of
procedural due process is correct. Second, there are "independent"
theories of procedural due process that are best regarded, not as
alternatives to my theory, but as supplements to it. Thus, procedural
due process includes not only those procedures entailed by substantive
constitutional rights, but also those procedures demanded by certain
constitutional values that are implicated only by adjudicative procedures. The twofold difficulty faced by these theories is showing that

42.
City &
43.
44.

See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Londoner v.
County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
See cases and authorities cited supra note 40.
See generally Primer, supra note 6, at 1353-62.
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their favorite values are indeed in the Constitution, and explaining
why those values have no substantive constitutional implications.
Those independent theories of procedural due process that compete
with mine argue that only when the government converts an optional
benefit from a mere privilege into "property" or "liberty" does the
due process clause require certain procedures. The majority in Roth
took this position, and it still represents the Supreme Court's general
approach to procedural due process. Several academic commentators
also take this position.
The problem this position faces is developing a theory to account
for when and why a mere privilege is transformed into "liberty" or
"property" protected by constitutionally-mandated procedures. The
Court's opinions have done nothing but spawn confusion. And while
academic supporters of this approach are clearer than the Court, they
46
are ultimately unconvincing. Timothy Terrel 45 and Stephen Williams
urge that government's monopolistic position with respect to the benefit or its adequate substitutes should determine whether procedures
are constitutionally required. But unless their argument is ultimately
premised on substantive constitutional values, they are vulnerable to
the rejoinder, "Why worry about the procedures for allocating the
benefit when the rules that define eligibility are of no constitutional
concern?" In other words, the fact that an individual must deal with
the government to obtain a certain type of benefit may be a good
reason for concluding that substantive constitutional values limit the
government's discretion both in defining eligibility for the benefit and
in choosing procedures for determining who is eligible. Government
monopoly is not a good argument for a concern only with adjudicative
procedures.
Just as important, government monopoly is not a good argument
for a total lack of concern with the adjudicative procedures by which
other, non-monopolized optional benefits are allocated. Terrell, in his
contribution to this symposium, argues for a waiver theory to support
the position that no procedures are constitutionally required when
non-monopolized privileges are allocated. 47 But waiver begs the ques-

45. Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the "Goveniment-as-Monopolist" Theory of the Due ProcessClause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491 (1982); Terrell,
"Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition and Theory in Legal
Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861 (1982).
46. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEG.
STUD. 3 (1983).
47. Terrell, Liberty and Responsibility in the Land of "New Property": Exploring the
Limits of Procedural Due Process, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 351 (1987).
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tion of what constitutional rights regarding procedure define the
baseline from which waivers are or are not made.
Edward Rubin takes the position that due process applies whenever
government decides to allocate a benefit according to specific rules
rather than through administrative discretion,4 a position that probably represents what the Court believes but has been unable to articulate. Rubin posits "fair and accurate application of rules" as the value
that the due process clause constitutionalizes. But he fails to convince
me that such a value makes sense divorced from a concern with the
substantive fairness of the rules themselves. Either admitting the link
between the concern with substance and the concern with procedure
reduces Rubin's (and the Court's) position to mine, 49 or it leaves an
unjustified chasm separating the allocation of benefits according to
rules from the allocation of benefits according to administrativediscretion. Substantive values and their procedural implications apply, however, to both forms of allocation.
It is unclear why justices on the Court, Rubin, and others have
been led to conclude that the distinction between legislative rules and
administrative discretion is significant in the context of procedural
due process. The commitment of an issue to administrative discretion
essentially puts the administrator into a role that combines both legislating standards and applying them. Substantive constitutional standards apply to such a role, including the application aspect of the role.
If anything, because the administrator is playing two roles, and some
of the checks and balances of tri-partite government are absent, more
procedure rather than less is warranted.5 1
It seems to me that the legislative rule/administrative discretion
dichotomy is principally a separation of powers concern, not an individual rights concern, though individuals, of course, have standing to
invoke separation of powers issues.2 Separation of powers is not, nor
could it be, procedural due process. Procedural due process applies
to state and local governments, but no federal constitutional concern,

48. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044 (1984).
49. There are indications that Rubin's position is close to mine. See id. at 1107 & n.303.
But Rubin maintains that he rejects my linkage of procedural rights to substantive constitutional
values. Letter from Edward Rubin to Larry Alexander (March 11, 1985).
50. See Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 765-67
(1977).
51. See Mashaw, supra note 35, at 1-8.
52. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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except perhaps the non-justiciable Guaranty Clause, 3 governs ultra
vires state and local administrative action. 4 From the standpoint of
procedural due process, the administrative procedures for applying
rules of eligibility for benefits must be treated as legislatively authorized, as part of the rules of eligibility themselves. Chief Justice
Rehnquist is correct on this point.s His error lies not in the assumption
that rules and their procedure are a package, but in his assumption
that when optional benefits are at stake, the package may be as arbitrary as the legislature wishes.
Rubin recognizes that procedural due process and separation of
powers are separate constitutional concerns. The due process clause
governs all unfair or inaccurate procedures for adjudications under
legislative rules, even if the adjudicative procedures are legislatively
blessed. If, however, Rubin admits that the legislature could prescribe,
as part of its substantive rule, each of the steps the rule-applier follows
and each of the factual inferences made, then one can legitimately
ask what constitutional values, besides separation of powers, the ruleapplier violates when acting without that legislative mandate. On the
other hand, if Rubin denies that the legislature may constitutionally
authorize those procedures as part of its substantive rule, then it must
be because the legislation is substantively unconstitutional. That is so
because the legislatureis not adjudicatingunder rules, but is legislating a rather complex rule instead.
It therefore appears that Rubin argues for the same position I
defend. Both types of procedural defects that he discusses, arbitrary
procedures and arbitrary departures from non-arbitrary procedures,
are unconstitutional if, and only if, they cannot constitutionally be
legislatively prescribed as part of the substantive rules that are applied
through them. And that type of unconstitutionality - unconstitutionality in legislation - is a product of substantive constitutional values.
The independent theories of procedural due process that supplement rather than contradict my substantive theory usually posit some
value, such as "dignity' ' 6 or "association," 57 that they claim is both a

53. U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
54. See Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
55. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974).
56. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a DignitaryTheory, 61 B.U.L.
REV. 885 (1981); Pincoffs, Due Process, Fraternity,and a Kantian Injunction, in DUE PROCESS,
NoMos XVIII 172, 175-79 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977); Saphire, Specifying Due
Process Values: Toward a MAore Responsive Approach to ProceduralProtection, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 111 (1978).
57. See lichelman, supra note 12.
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constitutional value and one particularly served by adjudicative procedures like trial-type hearings. The "procedural" due process clause's
unique constitutional contribution is to foster values like dignity by
demanding trial-type hearings in at least some cases where such hearings are more procedure than substantive constitutional rights themselves require.
I am not sure what this type of theory entails. For example, it is
perfectly consistent with my argument to posit dignity as a substantive
constitutional value that, like other substantive values, has implications for procedures as well as for rules and policies. On the other
hand, if "dignity" is a purely "procedural" value, I have considerable
difficulty comprehending it. 8 Is the hypothetical college teacher's dignity offended by having the decision to renew the contract depend on
comparing the teacher's published articles, student evaluations, and
resume to those of other candidates for the position? Is it offended
when all other constitutional values are satisfied by that procedure,
and the only complaint is that the procedure is not a "hearing"? Is it
offended more than the dignity of those applicants who were evaluated
solely upon resumes? The substantive constitutional values at stake
in an adjudicative decision can be looked to in order to determine the
constitutional weight of more accurate procedures. Such weight can
then be compared with the costs of more accurate procedures, costs
that are not merely monetary and often can be themselves translated
into substantive constitutional values. An independent right to more
procedure than that calculus warrants, a right based on "dignitary
values," seems to be a constitutional wildcard indeterminate in scope
and potentially perverse in effect, especially if the ordinary procedural
calculus is correctly employed.
My criticisms of "dignitary" theories of procedural due process do
not extend to the dignitary theory presented by Jerry Mashaw in this
symposium. 59 Mashaw and I agree that the current Supreme Court's
approach to procedural due process is wrongheaded for the reasons
articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist to the effect that substance
and procedure are a (sometimes "bittersweet") package. Mashaw and
I also agree that "life, liberty, and property" are terms of inclusion

58. I also have difficulty with the position that dignity and other similar values are substantive values that are implicated by substantive legislative rules and policies but are only constitutionalized to the extent that they bear on adjudicative procedures. Why would the framers
care about adjudicative procedures that offend dignity but not substantive rules and policies
that do so?
59.

Mashaw, supra note 35, at 439-43.
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and refer to all interests the deprivation of which implicates substantive constitutional values. Mashaw's dignitary value is definitely a
substantive constitutional value; that is, a value having implications
for the constitutionality of the substance of rules as well as for the
procedures by which they are to be applied. Indeed, Mashaw's dignitary value represents his version of how to flesh out the general substantive value of non-arbitrariness that I read into the Constitution.
Finally, Mashaw's dignitary value does not require hearings in all
cases, a result I also endorse. In short, I view Mashaw's dignitary
theory to be a more particular version of my own theory. It is a
substantive theory of procedural due process having none of the difficulties of theories that speak only to the procedures by which rules
are applied and not to their content.
My tentative conclusion is that substantive constitutional rights
are not only the source of procedural constitutional rights, but also
the limits of those rights. I am not convinced that there is any substance-independent constitutional right to procedure.60
V. CONCLUSION

I have done little in this paper beyond linking procedural constitutional rights to substantive ones. I have shown that procedures for
finding the adjudicative facts upon which the application of rules and
policies depends are subject to constitutional constraints in all cases,
the right/privilege distinction notwithstanding. I have also shown that
the constitutional constraints, while demanding more in the way of
procedure than many believe, do not demand trial-type hearings in
every case. On the other hand, I have not explained the right/privilege
distinction, or why the allocation of privileges implicates substantive
constitutional rights, "the greater power includes the lesser" argument
notwithstanding. Nor have I shown what process is due or when in
particular situations that process is due, but only that those questions
are answered by resort to substantive constitutional values. In short,
I have not shown what one will find in exploring the mysteries of
procedural due process, but only where one should look.61

60.

See also Primer, supra note 6, at 1378-79 n.264 (raising question whether procedural

protections imply substantive protections).
61. It is interesting to speculate whether the tie between substantive and procedural constitutional rights is less than obvious today because law schools have severed substantive courses

from the courses that deal with their procedural framework.
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